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1 Introduction
The international transfers of major conventional weapons is one of the most dynamic
sector of international trade. Although the 2008 financial crisis has affected many indus-
tries worldwide and has caused a general reduction in government spending, the global
volume of arms transfers has grown by 14% between 2004-08 and 2009-13, according to
the 2014 report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Wezeman &
Wezeman, 2014). Most of the countries in the world import weapons, and between 2004-
2008 and 2009-13 imports increased by a staggering 53% in Africa, by 34% in Asia, by
10% in the Americas, by 3% in the Middle East, and decreased by 25% in Europe.1
The arms trade is a very controversial issue with many economic and strategic impli-
cations on both sides of the transaction. On the demand side, countries import weapons
for reasons of national security, but a combination of prices, income and international
political relations affects the optimal bundle of domestic production - sometimes in col-
laboration with other partners - and import of weapon systems. Using network analysis,
Akerman & Seim (2014) show that in the last six decades, the global arms trade network
has become more dense, clustered and decentralized over time. Particularly since the end
of the Cold War, the market has become more globalized, with increasing interdepen-
dence and cooperation. Today, virtually no states are self-sufficient in arms production,
including the US, and self-produced arms need to be complemented by imported weapons
or components (see Brauer, 2007). As such, arms import is an essential component of
the defense budget.
On the supply side, countries sell weapons for economic reasons, and defence industries
are economically strategic in terms of R&D intensity, spin-offs and decreasing unit costs
(Sandler & Hartley, 1999; Garcia-Alonso & Levine, 2007). Although producing weapons
can be inefficient for some countries, many developed economies maintain a domestic
defense industrial base for economic and strategic needs, i.e., to protect and promote
the so-called “national champions” and ensure a level of autonomy. At the same time,
subsidies to the domestic arms manufacturers often increase their international market
share. Yet, economic motivations are frequently accompanied by political interests; in
1In the period 2009-2013, the top ten major suppliers of weapons were the US, Russia, Germany,
China, France, UK, Spain, Ukraine, Italy and Israel while the top ten recipients were India, China,
Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, US, Australia, South Korea, Singapore and
Algeria.
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fact, by exporting weapons, countries also seek to improve the military capabilities of the
recipient states. As a necessary adjunct of national policy and strategic doctrine, weapons
are often given only to close allies and it is not unusual to observe arms transferred free
to allies, under the umbrella of military aid. By the same token, the absence of trade
between pairs of country can reflect arms denial and constraints on transfers to specific
recipients so as to safeguard national security.2
The arms trade has both a political and economic component, and the question of
which factors are more likely to affect the bilateral flows of weapons is a timely and
important issue. Given its size and scope, there is surprisingly little empirical research on
the arms trade, particularly on its determinants (see Bergstrand, 1992; Smith & Tasiran,
2005, 2010; Comola, 2012; Akerman & Seim, 2014). Against this backdrop, we show that
the arms trade lies at the intersection of foreign policy and economic concerns and it is an
active tool of both geopolitical and economic competition. We use the most economically
and politically prominent energy source, oil, and demonstrate how oil interdependence is
a critical determinant of the volume of the arms trade between countries.
A recent theoretical model by Garfinkel et al. (2015) explores the consequences of
interstate disputes over contested resources, such as oil, for defence spending and trade
flows. Contestation of natural resources plays a big role in many interstate disputes and
shapes the security policies of the countries involved. Oil, in particular, is a highly “politi-
cized” commodity and responds to international political relations even in times of peace
(Mityakov et al. , 2013). Civil wars, violent regime changes, and regional instabilities
have long been a significant cause of oil shocks, in particular when involving oil-abundant
regions. Since the end-use of arms export concerns the security of the recipients, we claim
that oil-dependent economies have strong incentives to give away arms to reduce the risk
of instability in oil-rich and potentially unstable regions. Specularly, oil-rich countries
are more likely to receive weapons by oil-dependent economies.
We estimate the effects of oil interdependence using a gravity model of international
trade and explore the extent to which the economic and political characteristics of the
client and the supplier, and the connections between them, affect the bilateral arms trade.
Deciphering the impact of oil dependence on the arms trade is complicated by the fact that
oil and weapons could be simultaneously determined and our model could potentially omit
2Interestingly, however, arms exports may generate negative externalities when e.g., the importing
nation becomes a future threat (see Garcia-Alonso & Levine, 2007).
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relevant confounders affecting both variables. On the one hand, establishing a relationship
between the two variables leaves open the question of whether “oil causes weapons” or
vice versa. We strive to include plausibly exogenous variables, such as indicators for the
known amount of oil reserves, information on natural resource windfalls - those arising
from the discoveries of new oil fields as well as giant oilfields - and oil price shocks.
On the other hand, there are a number of important confounding factors, whose
omission could bias the estimates. For example, developed countries that rely on the
manufacturing sector might be more likely to be arms producers and at the same time to
be net importers of oil. More generally, the presence of specialization and comparative
advantages could bias our estimates. We therefore control for multilateral resistance terms
i.e., importer-time and exporter-time fixed effects (see e.g., Anderson & van Wincoop,
2003), which flexibly account for time-varying country-specific unobservables. Also, in
some specifications, we include country-pair fixed effects to capture all time-invariant
unobservable bilateral factors influencing arms trade flows. Finally, we implement a
battery of robustness checks to support our identifying assumption, including placebo
regressions where we use exports of machinery and transport equipment with high levels
of sophistication as outcome variable. These additional models help us clarify whether
arms are indeed a special commodity with exceptional implications for the type and
quality of bilateral economic and political relations.
To anticipate, our empirical analysis paints a clear picture and supports our claim that
oil is a crucial factor affecting the volume of arms flows on both sides of the transaction.
We proceed as follows: section 2 provides a brief overview of the latest theoretical and
empirical literature on the arms trade and elaborate on our hypothesized mechanism.
Section 3 presents the data and the empirical strategy. Section 4 discusses our main
empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Energy security and the demand and supply for weapons
The majority of scholarly research on the arms trade takes the form of theoretical models,
which usually focus on the strategic interactions between exporters and importers, and
the implications for arms races and arms proliferation - see, e.g., the seminal dynamic
models offered by Levine & Smith (1995, 1997, 2000b), who also discuss possible common
control regimes. Levine & Smith (2000a), in particular, integrate economic and strategic
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incentives within a unified framework, and analyze national and international regulatory
regimes and market structures. They find that whereas prices have dampening effects
on arms race, regulatory regimes can have either positive or negative effects on domestic
production and arms imports. Garcia-Alonso & Levine (2007) build on the above mod-
els to discuss the main strategic characteristics of the arms trade and to examine the
determinants of market structure in the military sector. Sandler (2000) explores collec-
tive action failures in relation to arms control and security. Kollias & Sirakoulis (2002)
model the effects that arms imports have on the military balance between two antago-
nistic regional players. Finally, Seitz et al. (2015) provide a model of trade, conflict and
defence spending with an arms race and determine the magnitude of welfare gains due
to reductions in the likelihood of conflict and defense spending cuts.
Empirical works on the decision-making processes behind the arms trade and on
the characteristics and relations between suppliers and recipients are scant at best.3
Bergstrand (1992) estimates the effects of arms reduction on world trade using data
for 17 OECD countries over the 1975-1985 period. He also uses a gravity model for gain-
ing insight in the economic determinants of the arms trade and finds that the model is
limited in its capacity to explain this sort of trade, as it is “determined largely by political,
military or other non-economic factors” (Bergstrand, 1992, p.137). Blanton (2000, 2005)
explores the impact of human rights and democracy on the eligibility of a country to re-
ceive weapons from the USA. Smith & Tasiran (2005, 2010) examine the factors affecting
the elasticity of arms imports with respect to military expenditure, per capita income and
the price of arms imports, and address issues of measurement errors, non-linearity and
dynamic specification. Comola (2012) explores the existence of political cycles in arms
exports using data on the top 20 major exporters over the period 1975-2004; she finds
that right-wing incumbents increase arms exports, whereas higher concentration of power
and incumbents serving the last year of their term and potentially running for re-election
have the opposite effect. Finally, Akerman & Seim (2014) find a negative relationship
between differences in the polity and the likelihood of the arms trade during the Cold
War.
We advance the relevance of geo-economic and geo-strategic considerations and sug-
gest that energy interdependence is a major factor explaining the volume of arms transfers
3A number of empirical studies reverse the causal arrow and look at the effects of arms transfer on
several outcomes, such as interstate conflict, ethnic uprisings and repression; Kinsella (2011) offers a
comprehensive and recent review of this strand of the literature.
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between states. In doing so, we expand the range of perspectives on the arms trade be-
yond questions of economic and political determinants at the national level to issues of
energy dependence at the international level.
The arms trade, security and energy dependence are heavily interconnected. On the
demand side, recipients receive weapons mainly for reasons of national security as the
acquisition of new equipments improve their defense capabilities (e.g., Levine & Smith,
2000b). Although other reasons for importing weapons exist, security is usually the main
objective. On the supply side, arms are exported to support the security needs of friends
and allies, and to strengthen security links. Moreover, many countries receive military
aid to buy weapons and equipment from the donor country. The US is the largest sup-
plier of military aid to over 150 foreign countries in the world, with the explicit goal of
contributing to regional and global stability, strengthening military support for demo-
cratically elected governments and containing transnational threats (see US Greenbook,
2012).4
Therefore, the end-use of the arms trade concerns the security of the recipients. We
claim that this is particularly crucial when the recipient state is a main supplier of energy
and when the arms exporter is dependent on it. Conspiracy theorists have long insisted
that modern wars revolve around oil, the main energy source worldwide. The post-WWII
period has many instances of military intervention in oil-rich states, such as in Angola,
Chad, Guatemala, Indonesia, Mali, Nigeria, Sudan and the Philippines. Recent events
include the military intervention in Libya in 2011 by a coalition comprising most of NATO
oil-dependent economies, or the US campaign against Isis in northern Iraq. Bove et al.
(2015) finds that the likelihood of a third-party intervention in civil war increases when
the country at war has large reserves of oil and such interventions are more likely to be
carried out by countries that highly depend on oil imports. Yet, military intervention is
expensive and risky and can easily cause domestic backlash if the benefits are not clear-
cut. To support the security needs of allies and strategic partners, countries can resort
to alternative, less invasive, foreign policy tools.
We argue that the provision of security extends beyond direct military intervention
and war times and that the export of arms is an effective substitute for costlier forms of
assistance. The arms trade therefore contributes to counter local threats, to inhibit or
4USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services (2012): US Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations
and Loan Authorizations Greenbook (http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/)
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reduce the risk of political instabilities and, as a result, the chances of disruption in the
oil trade. Violent events such as civil wars or terrorist incidents are often accompanied
by surging oil prices, or more generally insecurity in the supply of oil; this was the case in
many recent wars, such as during the Gulf War, 9/11, the Iraq War, the Lebanon Conflict
and the political unrests in Venezuela in 2003. Political instabilities do not necessarily
cause disruptions in oil production, yet they can affect prices and/or future supplies.
Kilian (2009) explores exogenous political events in the Middle East and find that wars
or revolutions affect the real price of oil through “their effect on precautionary demand
for oil. The latter channel can produce immediate and potentially large effects on the real
price of oil through shifts in the uncertainty about future oil supply shortfalls, even when
crude oil production has not changed” (Kilian, 2009, p. 1064). The prospects of energy
supply disruptions and increases in oil prices can easily put at risk fragile economies while
posing significant costs for more developed countries. Disruptions in the oil industry and
higher oil prices may in fact negatively affect the real GDP growth, the real wages and
increase the short-term interest rates (e.g., Kilian, 2008; Lippi & Nobili, 2012). These
negative effects are more likely to materialize in oil-importing countries, which therefore
have incentives to reduce the risk of instabilities in oil-rich countries.
A seminal study by SIPRI (1971), identifies, among the purposes of arms supply,
a “hegemonic” aim: countries can use arms transfers to “support a particular group in
power, or to prevent the emergence of an alternative group” (SIPRI 1971, p. 17). This
is consistent with recent studies which provide convincing evidence that military aid can
be effective at keeping terrorist groups out of power (see Bapat, 2011). Therefore, the
deliveries of major conventional weapons can be put forward as evidence of the supplier’s
commitment to the security and military advantage of the recipient state. In most of the
wars fought in the last few decades and in most of the confrontations between states and
terrorist groups, foreign arms, or restraints on arms supplies, have played a central role in
determining the success of the combatants. Ensuring the military advantage of a country
against domestic and external threats is all the more important when this country is
a key supplier of oil and when the arms supplier is dependent on oil. Improving the
security of the oil-rich economies makes them more reliable suppliers of oil, and, at the
same time, reduces the uncertainty about shortages in future oil supplies, which affect oil
prices (Kilian, 2009).
Note, however, that we are not suggesting the sole existence of a direct oil-for-weapons
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mechanism. By providing weapons, the oil-dependent country seeks to contain the risk
of instabilities in a oil-rich country; yet, the latter does not necessarily need to be its
direct oil supplier, because disruptions in the production of oil in this country are very
likely to affect oil prices worldwide. In sum, we seek to test two related expectations, or
hypotheses:
H1 (local dependence): The larger the amount of oil imported from a
country, the higher the volume of arms exported to the same country
H2 (global dependence): The larger the level of global oil dependence, the
higher the volume of arms exported to oil-rich countries
Although theoretically intertwined, the two mechanisms require two substantially
different empirical models, the issue considered next.
3 Data and Empirical Strategy
To measure the volume of international transfers of arms we use the SIPRI Arms Transfers
Database, which contains information on all transfers of major conventional weapons since
1950. SIPRI has developed a unique system that uses a common unit, the trend-indicator
value (TIV), to permit comparisons between deliveries of different weapons. The TIV
is based on the known unit production costs of a core set of weapons and is useful to
estimate the transfer of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer.
The TIV fits well with the purpose of our analysis, explaining the quantities of arms
transfers rather than the contracted prices, which can be as low as zero in the case of
military aid.5
To measure oil dependence, we assemble a very comprehensive dataset on stock vari-
ables such as oil reserves and new oil discoveries, as well as on flow variables, in particular
oil imports and exports. Data on oil reserves and on new oil discoveries in thousand mil-
lion barrels come from Cotet & Tsui (2013), who draw information from the Association
for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas, the BP Statistical Review of World Energy, and the
Oil & Gas Journal. In addition, we use data on giant oilfield discoveries from Lei &
5More details are available on SIPRI’s website (http://www.sipri.org/databases/
armstransfers).
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Michaels (2014), where giant oilfields are those containing ultimate recoverable reserves
(URR) of 500 million barrels (bbl) equivalent or more before extraction begins.
To test Hypothesis 1, we first construct a measure of net oil import, using disag-
gregated bilateral trade flows from Feenstra et al. (2005). This measure indicates the
volume of net import of oil of the arms exporter (i.e., the oil-dependent country) from
the arms importer (i.e., the oil-rich country). Note that this variable can be thought of
as being made by two components. The first is whether the country-pair includes an
oil-producing and an oil-dependent country, otherwise net imports would be zero; the
second is whether the pair of countries actually has an established trading relationship,
which is related to whether they are economic partners and/or political allies. The data
are organized by 4-digit SITC Revision 2, and cover trade flows reported by 149 countries
(98% of world exports) for the period from 1962 to 1999. The availability of data on oil
flows limits our study to the same period.6
We then estimate the effect of net oil import on the arms trade between countries
using a gravity equation model and the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML)
estimator developed by Santos Silva & Tenreyro (2006).7 The gravity equation takes the
following form:
Yijt = α exp(β Net oil importijt +G
′
ij δ +D
′
ijt λ+ θit + τjt) ijt (1)
where Yijt is the volume of major weapons transfers from country i to country j at
time t, and Net oil importijt is our variables of interest, the degree of oil dependence of
6Note that the limit of the sample is not particular to our study, and most other studies use the
Feenstra et al.’s data for similar analyses. As Baier et al. (2014, p.344) puts it, Feenstra et al. (2005) is
“the most disaggregated publicly available data set for bilateral trade flows for a large number of years
and a large number of country pairs, constructed on a consistent basis”.
7There are several advantages of using the PPML over alternative models. First, the value of our
dependent variable is most often zero, and the classical log-log gravity model is unsuitable when Yijt is
zero. Dropping all the observation with no trade induces a sample selection issue, and we would lose
a number of important information on cases of arms denial and constraints on the export of weapons
to specific states. Using the logarithm of Yijt + 1 as the dependent variable generates inconsistency in
the parameter of interest (Santos Silva & Tenreyro, 2006). Moreover, our dependent variable is highly
heteroskedastic; we have small deviation when i and j are small countries with no political relations,
whereas large values and large dispersions around the mean are observed when i and j are powerful
and connected. Under heteroskedasticity, estimating log-linearized equation by OLS leads to significant
biases. However, the PPML estimator is robust to different patterns of heteroskedasticity, provides a
natural way to deal with zeros in trade data, and is resilient to measurement error of Yijt, which can
potentially contaminate our analysis (see Santos Silva & Tenreyro, 2006, 2011). A recent article by Fally
(2015) also argues in favor of the PPML and gives additional motivation for using it.
9
country i from country j at time t. The vector G′ij includes the classical impediments
or facilitating factors in a list of time-invariant gravity controls, namely: the capital-to-
capital distance; a measure of religious distance; a set of binary variables taking value
one if i and j have a common language, common ethnicity or colonial history. The
vector D′ijt includes a number of time-varying gravity controls, in particular a binary
variable taking value one if i and j have a common currency, and a dummy that equals
one for regional trade agreements (RTAs) in force. Moreover, we include information
on military alliances and political affinities; the latter measures the preferences of each
state, or more precisely, the interest similarity among pairs of states on the basis of voting
patterns at the UN General Assembly (see Voeten & Merdzanovic, 2009, for further
details). θit and τjt serve, respectively, as exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects,
accounting for the multilateral resistance terms. Note that the inclusion of importer-
time and exporter-time fixed effects addresses endogeneity bias that might arise from
the omission of important determinants of arms export. These are meant to capture all
unobservable time-varying characteristics for both country i and j, e.g. the relevance of
the manufacturing sector, which is energy-intensive, or the presence of specialization and
comparative advantages. To further address endogeneity concerns, in some specifications,
we include country-pair fixed effects which allow to take into account all time-invariant
bilateral factors (e.g. any form of connections between countries) affecting arms trade
flows and year fixed-effects. We also include year fixed effects to deal with the potential
co-evolution of arms transfers and net oil import over time. Finally, ijt is a multiplicative
error term with E(ijt|Net oil importijt, G′ij, D′ijt, θit, τjt) = 1, assumed to be statistically
independent of the regressors. We report robust standard errors clustered at the country-
pair level to allow for the variance to differ across pairs; this further addresses the issue
of heteroskedasticity in the error terms and controls for autocorrelation by allowing an
unstructured covariance within the clusters.
Although equation (1) is our preferred specification, we also estimate a less stringent
version of it, where we replace multilateral resistance terms with a set of country i’s
and country j’s characteristics, respectively. More specifically, the set of country i’s
characteristics includes real GDP to capture the economic size of the country (larger
countries should import higher volumes of weapons); the level of democracy (the Polity
IV indicator) to capture the degree of institutional development; the level of military
spending in % of the GDP and the number of armed forces in % of the population; and
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the membership in NATO or the Warsaw pact. The set of country j’s characteristics
includes all the above variables and additional controls to account for any form of intra-
state and inter-state conflict involving country j; the number of wars in its neighbourhood
to pick up additional security threats; and the presence of an international arms embargo
on j. Table A.1 provides information on the name, definition and source of all the above
variables, and Table A.2 contains the summary statistics.8
Hypothesis 2 states that oil-dependent countries are more inclined to export arms
to oil-rich countries, in order to safeguard its political stability and, as a consequence,
prevent oil shocks and higher oil prices in international markets. To test Hypothesis 2,
we augment equation (1), with an interaction between a dummy indicating whether the
arms exporter is an oil-dependent country in the global system and a dummy indicating
whether the arms importer is an oil-rich country in the global system. This simple
strategy allows us to disentangle the effect on the arms trade of a global oil dependence,
when the arms exporter wants to keep global oil prices stable in international markets,
from that of a local oil dependence, when the arms exporter wants to safeguard the supply
of oil from a particular country. We therefore estimate the following model:
Yijt = α exp(β Net oil importijt + γ Oil dependentit ∗Oil richjt +G′ij δ +D
′
ijt λ+ θit + τjt) ijt (2)
Oil dependentit is a dummy that takes value one if country i is net importer of oil
in the global system, i.e., when the balance of global trade in oil (the difference between
global volumes of oil import and oil export) is negative. Oil richjt is a dummy that takes
value one if country j is rich in oil. As a proxy for the abundance of oil in country j,
we use stock variables such as oil reserves and new oilfield discoveries at time t in lieu of
flow variables like oil production which could be potentially endogenous to arms import.
On one hand, the timing and relative size of new oilfield discoveries are mostly random,
at least in the short-medium run, as prospecting for oil is highly uncertain, and countries
have generally little control over the timing of such discoveries (see e.g., Lei & Michaels,
2014). Moreover, oil discoveries conveys important information about the potential for
oil production in the very near future. Cotet & Tsui (2013) and Lei & Michaels (2014),
among others, discuss how (unexpected) oil discoveries generate exogenous variation in
oil wealth and increase per capita oil production and oil exports. On the other hand, to
8Note that since the algorithm does not converge when the dependent variable has large values, we
follow Santos Silva & Tenreyro’s (2006) advice and rescale it. Rescaling arms transfers does not affect
the substantive interpretation of the coefficients of interest.
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ensure that our results are not driven by this particular operationalization, we also use
alternative definitions of the Oil rich dummy, which takes the value one if a country’s
total amount of oil reserves belongs to the 75th, 90th, 95th or 99th percentile of the
total (global) oil reserves at time t. This stock variable should be less vulnerable to
endogeneity concerns than oil production, as reserves depend on geological features and
previous exploration efforts. Our parameter of interest is now γ as it speaks to the
issue of global oil interdependence (Hypothesis 2), whereas β speaks to the issue of local
dependence (Hypothesis 1).
4 Empirical results
4.1 Arms transfers and local oil dependence
Tables 1 and 2 provide the main tests of Hypothesis 1, a direct oil-for-weapons exchange.
Before moving to the most stringent specification, i.e. a model with multilateral resistance
terms in equation (1), we start with less demanding models. Column (1) in Table 1
provides an initial test of the impact of net oil import on the volume of the arms trade,
when no other control variables are included. The estimated coefficients for net oil import
is positive and significantly discernible from zero at the 1% level. In column (2) we include
the set of monadic controls (i.e., country i- and country j-specific characteristics). In
column (3) we add the set of dyadic controls (i.e., country-pair characteristics). In column
(4) we control for year dummies, and in column (5) for a linear time trend. Our coefficient
of interest, β, is remarkably stable across model specifications and remains positive and
statistically significant at the 1% level. The PPML specification allows for direct reading
of the coefficients, and the substantive interpretation is similar to a semi-elasticity. Net oil
import is measured in 10 million metric tons with a mean value of 0.0028 (28,000 metric
tons) and a standard deviation of 0.0048 (48,000 metric tons). Based on the estimate in
column (4), this means that a one-standard deviation increase in the net oil import of
country i from country j will lead to a 21% increase in the volume of arms transfers from
i to j.9 These findings provide a first corroboration of the thesis outlined by Hypothesis
1 and demonstrates that the higher is the net oil import of country i from country j, i.e.,
its local oil dependence on country j, the higher is its exports of arms to j.
9One metric ton corresponds to 8.45 barrels. The semi-elasticity needs to be computed as expβˆ − 1.
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—————— [Table 1 in here] ——————
We now briefly turn to our contextual covariates on the supply and demand side of
the arms trade. We find that the arms trade is a positive function of both i’s and j’s
real GDP. It is not however associated with the level of democracy in the exporting and
importing country. We include the military spending in % of the GDP to capture military
capabilities on the supply side, and perception of threats on the demand side, when it
is not adequately picked up by the war variables. Military spending display a positive
effect, significant at conventional levels, on both sides. We also include the number of
armed forces in % of the population for both i and j, a proxy of the labour intensity
of a country’s force structure (see, e.g., Smith & Tasiran, 2005, 2010). Whereas this is
negative on the supply side, it is positive on the demand side, reflecting the modernization
of labour-intensive armed forces. Note also that being a member of NATO (or the Warsaw
pact) increases (decreases) the volume of arms export, but it does not significantly affect
the demand for weapons. As one would expect, the number of wars in the immediate
vicinity of j (neighboring wars) increases its import of weapons while domestic war is not
significantly different from zero.
On the demand side, results mirror previous studies on the decision to import arms,
which reflects threats, proxied here by wars or military spending, and the size of a country,
proxied by the GDP (see Smith & Tasiran, 2010). The presence of international arms
embargo against the importing country reduces its level of arms import, due to possible
compliance dynamics, but it fails to achieve statistical significance. Our two measures
of connectedness, military alliances and political affinity, display a positive sign; this
indicates that arms transfers between two states depend on the presence and strength
of cordial diplomatic and military relations. Following the traditional literature on the
determinants of bilateral trade, we also include customary control variables, such as the
geographic distance, the presence of a common religion, a common ethnicity, a common
language, a common colonial history and a regional trade agreement. We omit these
additional rows due to space limitations, although the full results can be produced with
our replication material.10
10Whereas the effect of most of these variables is in the expected direction, geographic distance is
often insignificant or positive. Bergstrand (1992) finds a negative effect of distance on the arms trade,
yet he uses only 17 OECD countries. A negative effect could be driven by countries’ strategic decision to
deny arms transfers to potential regional competitors. Interestingly, distance becomes negative in Table
5 when we exclude major players.
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Although we strive to control for a host of determinants of the arms trade and get as
close of an estimate as possible of a pure “local oil dependence” effect, it is still possible
that unobservable factors affect both the transfers of arms and the net import of oil. In
such a case, the PPML estimation might produce biased estimates. To address these
endogeneity concerns, in Table 2, column (1), we include country-specific (i and j) fixed
effects to account for time-invariant unobservables at the country level. While the omitted
variable bias generated by stable unit-level confounders is handled in the fixed-effects
model reported in column (1), this does not guard against confounders that are time
varying. Therefore in column (2) we estimate equation (1), a specification with the
inclusion of it and jt fixed effects (i.e., the multilateral resistance terms) to flexibly
capture all the time-varying barriers to trade that each country faces with all its trading
partners every year. This specification soaks up all the effects of country i’s and country
j’s characteristics in the it and jt fixed effects. In addition to this, in column (3) we run
a specification with country-pair fixed effects to absorb time-invariant characteristics at
the dyadic level.11 Note that this model requires us to exclude all dyads where we do not
observe variation in arms transfers over time, in our case almost half of the total number of
observations. Results in Table 2 show that our coefficient of interest remains statistically
significant when taking into account additional unobservables. Reading across the first
row of results in Table 2, we find that a standard deviation increase in the volume of net
oil import increases the bilateral arms transfer by a minimum of 8%.
—————— [Table 2 in here] ——————
4.2 Arms transfers and global oil dependence
Table 3 offers a direct test of Hypothesis 2, on the effect of global oil dependence, while
keeping local oil dependence (i.e., net oil import) constant. We also control for the full set
of country-pair’s characteristics and estimate models with multilateral resistance terms.
Reading across the first row of results, we find that net oil import continues to exert a
positive, significant and substantive effect on the volume of arms transfers; the coefficients
are similar in magnitude to those in Table 2, column (2), which makes use of the same
conservative specification with multilateral resistance terms.
11Note that we do not have enough variation in the data to estimate a model that includes it, jt and
ij fixed effects simultaneously (see summary statistics in Table A.2).
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The second row presents an interaction between the Oil dependent dummy, on the
supply side, and the Oil rich dummy, on the demand side. Whereas defining an oil-
dependent economy is quite straightforward (i.e., whether it is a net importer of oil
or not), we use alternative definitions of an Oil rich economy. In column (1) we look at
whether j has a positive discovery of oil at time t and we find that its interaction with Oil
dependent is associated with a 56% increase in the quantity of arms transfers. Columns (2)
to (5) display the results of four alterations of the definition of Oil rich, according to the
percentile distribution of oil reserves in country j, which provides an additional exogenous
source of variation. As one moves across the columns of the table, the stringency of this
definition gradually builds up and we find that only countries belonging to the 95th or
99th percentile of oil reserves at time t receive higher amount of arms, and that this effect
is conditional on whether the arms exporter is oil-dependent. Interestingly, the size of the
marginal effect in column (4) is very similar to that of column (1), around 0.5, although
they use quite different operationalizations of Oil rich. The other contextual variables all
continue to add significantly to the fit of the model in the same direction. This provides
further evidence that global oil dependence does matter, and that the volume of the arms
trade is systematically higher when the exporter is an oil-dependent economy and the
importer is a oil-rich country.
—————— [Table 3 in here] ——————
4.3 Robustness Checks
We test the robustness of our findings in a number of additional ways. First, we ask
whether the potential failure to fully address endogeneity concerns might introduce bias
into our estimated models. Therefore, in Table 4 we estimate a series of regressions as in
equation (1) and (2) using alternative exogenous sources of variation in local and global
oil dependence. In particular, following Brückner et al. (2012) and Bazzi & Blattman
(2014), we use changes in international oil prices over time to capture variation in the
local oil dependence. We examine the interaction between Avg. Net oil importij, the oil
dependence of country i from country j over the whole time period considered, and ∆ ln
oil pricet, the ln-change in international oil prices over time. As Brückner et al. (2012,
p. 390) put it, “this formulation captures that the impact of international oil price shocks
should be greater in countries with greater net oil exports over GDP”. In other words,
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as “the economy is most sensitive to commodity price shocks in commodity-dependent
nations” (Bazzi & Blattman, 2014, p.8), oil price shocks should be felt more strongly in
countries with greater bilateral oil dependence.12 Moreover, to further guard against bias
in estimating the effect of global oil dependence on the arms trade, our second hypothesis,
we use alternative definitions of Oil dependentit and Oil richjt. In column (3) we use an
indicator for countries with no oilfield discovery between time t and t−10 and an indicator
for countries with a giant oilfield discovery (with size in top quartile) between time t and
t − 3, respectively; in column (4) we use an indicator for countries with a share of the
global cumulative oil discoveries below the median at time t and an indicator for countries
with a share of the global cumulative oil discoveries above the 99th percentile at time t,
respectively. To avoid opening the door to subjective coding, Table A.3 replicates models
in Table 4 using indicators for countries with no oilfield discovery between time t and
t− s with s= 6, 7, 8, 9 and indicators for countries with giant oilfield discovery between
time t and t − s with s=4, 5, 6. Our results hold up well to this series of specification
checks and the size of the coefficients is almost unaltered, which increases the confidence
in our results.
—————— [Table 4 in here] ——————
Second, as errors for countries belonging to the same cluster may be correlated, it
is common to report standard errors that account for clustering of units. In our models
errors are likely to be correlated by country pair, given the complex economic and political
dependency structure that arises due to the connections between dyad members (Aronow
et al. , 2015). In fact, dyadic clustering could arise in many ways with these data, if e.g.,
a country enters into an alliance, thereby changing the military alliance indicators, or
if the political affinity changes (Aronow et al. , 2015). It is also customary to allow for
clustering by country pair in a gravity model context (Helpman et al. , 2008). Yet, as it
is sometimes difficult to justify why we use clustering in some dimensions but not others
(Abadie et al. , 2017), in Table 5, column (1) and (2), we re-estimate our baseline models
with robust standard errors clustered at exporter level. Our results remain statistically
significant at conventional levels.
12Note that, to facilitate the interpretation of our coefficients, a positive ∆ ln oil pricet implies a
reduction of oil prices, thus an increase in the local oil dependence. Note also that this strategy is not
entirely immune from other potential sources of endogeneity in this shock, and Bazzi & Blattman (2014)
discusses the possible caveats.
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Third, we ask whether our results are driven by specific outliers. Top arms exporters
in the period under consideration are the two global powers, USA and Russia, while
two countries, Saudi Arabia and Iran, are top oil producers and the major importers
of weapons. We exclude them in Table 5, columns (3) and (4), and, by and large, the
results carry over, thus suggesting that they do not rely on outliers. In fact, the size of
the coefficients is now larger than in models with the full sample.
Fourth although our hypotheses speak to the issue of oil dependence, it could be easily
extended to strategic natural resources, more generally. Gas is an obvious candidate, and
we reproduce the baseline models but use gas in lieu of oil. The results are shown in
columns (5)-(6) of Table 5. The coefficient on the interaction term is overall similar to
the ones presented above for the case of oil, while net gas import is similar in magnitude
but not statistically significant. This last result suggests that global dependence on gas
is more crucial than a direct gas-for-weapons relation.
—————— [Table 5 in here] ——————
Fifth, oil-rich economies often import goods and services in exchange for the oil that
they export. An important question is whether weapons are different from other manu-
factured goods that embody a similar level of technology. Therefore, in Table 6 we run
a number of placebo regressions by replacing arms transfers with “machinery and trans-
port equipment” (SITC code 7), i.e., machines with comparable levels of sophistication
as weapons but without clear military attributes. Our results show that none of the
coefficients of local and global oil dependence are significantly different from zero across
the various sectors. The results are interesting because they suggest that arms are indeed
a special commodity with economic and strategic implications that extend well beyond
those of conventional non-military items.13
—————— [Table 6 in here] ——————
Sixth, the decisions on whether to transfer weapons or not and on how much to trade
might not be completely independent, thus leading to selection bias; a common way to
correct for this issue is to estimate a sample selection model (see e.g., Egger et al. , 2011).
13We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting these placebo regressions. Note that we use all
divisions with the exception of 79 “Other transport equipment”, as this might include dual-use items -
i.e., equipment that can be used for both civil and military applications such as aircrafts and satellites.
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We therefore rely on a Heckman model (Heckman, 1979) which, in the first stage, explains
whether two countries trade or not using a Probit model and, in the second stage, uses
an OLS to explain the quantity of arms flows, conditional on the first stage. Because
of space limitations, the results are reported in the Appendix, Table A.4. We find that
global and local oil dependence are statistically significant in the selection equations, and
that local oil dependence explains also the volume of the arms trade after controlling
for selection whereas global oil dependence is not significant. There are however several
caveats associated with this procedure, and these last results should be interpreted with
caution.14
5 Conclusions
One of the most debated issues in the study of international economics revolves around
the question of whether and to what extent the economic ties between nations affect
or are affected by the “flag”, i.e., the nature and quality of their diplomatic relations.
The arms trade is a very sensitive issue as it reveals national interests beyond simple
economic considerations; as such, the volume of bilateral arms transfers can be used as
a barometer of political relations between the supplier and the recipient states. The
empirical literature on the arms trade is remarkably scarce and the aim of this article is
to advance the relevance of energy dependence, and in particular of oil, in explaining the
volume of arms transfers between countries. We claim that instances of political violence
can cause disruptions in the global supply of oil and increasing oil prices. Oil-dependent
economies have therefore incentives to provide security by selling or giving away arms to
oil-rich countries to lower their risks of political turmoils and instabilities. This indirect
military support should in turn ensure that countries maintain crude oil production within
a target range. By the same token, countries with proven as well as a potential for oil
14Selection models require identifying assumptions and the Heckman model is appropriate only when
at least one additional explanatory factor influences the selection but not the outcome equation. To
identify the parameters in both stages, we follow Helpman et al. (2008) and choose either common
religion (models 1 and 2) or common language (models 3 and 4) as the excluded variable. Yet, choosing
the right variable to omit from the outcome equation - one that is only correlated to the decision to
transfer weapons rather than to the actual level of arms flows - is very difficult. As a consequence,
the results are sensitive to the validity and correct specification of the two equations. Moreover, as
Santos Silva & Tenreyro (2006) point out, the validity of the estimator hinges critically also on the
assumption of homoskedasticity, which is unrealistic when we use trade data.
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production are more likely to receive weapons by oil-dependent economies. We argue for
the existence of both a bilateral or local oil dependence as well as a global oil dependence.
The former indicates that arms import is positively tied to the quantities of oil exported
to the arms supplier. Speculatively, arms export to a specific country is affected by the
degree of dependence on its supply of oil. The latter indicates that global dependence on
oil is a motivated factor for the arms trade and increases the volume of arms transfers
between countries, even in absence of a direct bilateral oil-for-weapons exchange.
To test these hypotheses, we assemble an extensive panel of oil wealth and oil trade
data, including stock variables such as the size of reserves and recent discoveries to prove
plausibly exogenous sources of variation; we also include flow variables, in particular the
bilateral and global balance of trade in oil of each country, to measure the potential
damage of regional instabilities to its oil supply. Our hypotheses about the impact of oil
dependence on the arms trade are strongly borne out by the empirical results. Overall,
the evidence seems to point consistently towards the conclusion that the arms trade can
be associated to attempts to securing and maintaining access to oil and stabilizing prices.
Our research has important implications for scholarship and policy. First, oil profits
can allow some nations to acquire advanced weapons systems or develop important secu-
rity programs. Agreements to exchange oil for weapons technology or systems, especially
to energy-starved countries, gives oil-rich countries useful leverage that can be employed
to advance military expansion and acquire capabilities and influence. Our research shows
how the oil trade is an important determinant of arms transfers and military expendi-
tures, more generally. In fact, according to the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,
following recent declines in national oil revenues, due to low oil prices, only 2 of the 15
countries with the largest falls in military spending in 2016 were not oil exporters.15 We
shed new light on the economic dimension of the arms trade and contribute to the large
literature on the demand for military spending. En route, we investigate the extent to
which the classical impediments or facilitating factors included in the gravity models of
trade affect the volume of the arms transfers. Second, the acquisitions of weapons often
represent long-term investments that require a commitment of decades. Moreover, the
replacements of air defense systems or naval ship building activities often require years to
negotiate, design, develop and build. Thus, oil revenues can be used to obtain long-term
15https://sipri.org/research/armament-and-disarmament/arms-transfers-and-military-spending/
military-expenditure
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purchase agreements for weapons and, at the same time, reinforce bilateral ties between
states. As such, oil might play an even larger role in influencing economic and political
decisions than is generally acknowledged. Because of the limited number of empirical
works on the arms trade and the fact that securing future energy supplies remains a
major challenge, there is certainly an interesting agenda for future research in this area.
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Table 1: Arms transfers and net oil import, PPML estimates
Arms transfersijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Net oil importijt 3.625*** 1.358** 1.731*** 1.662*** 1.695***
(0.535) (0.653) (0.600) (0.601) (0.594)
Country i’s characteristics
GDP 3.461*** 4.325*** 5.768*** 5.125***
(0.225) (0.303) (0.495) (0.373)
Democracy 0.026 0.027 0.017 0.014
(0.022) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017)
NATO 1.557*** 1.554*** 1.270*** 1.293***
(0.207) (0.219) (0.200) (0.199)
Warsaw pact -1.274** -1.215** -1.488*** -1.482***
(0.507) (0.488) (0.467) (0.469)
Military burden 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Soldiers per capita -19.478** -13.968* -26.424*** -27.176***
(7.663) (7.463) (9.263) (8.294)
Country j’s characteristics
GDP 2.927*** 3.446*** 4.582*** 4.171***
(0.626) (0.413) (0.555) (0.488)
Democracy 0.018 -0.007 -0.000 0.003
(0.021) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015)
NATO 0.414 -0.201 -0.262 -0.249
(0.422) (0.383) (0.307) (0.343)
Warsaw pact -1.166 -1.038 -1.257 -1.110
(0.905) (0.834) (0.853) (0.846)
Military burden 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Soldiers per capita 26.928*** 22.642*** 18.253*** 19.595***
(9.394) (6.576) (5.523) (6.086)
War 0.073 0.071 0.003 0.075
(0.200) (0.146) (0.176) (0.156)
Neighboring wars 0.164* 0.210*** 0.226*** 0.234***
(0.092) (0.068) (0.070) (0.069)
Arms embargo -0.887 -0.942 -0.699 -0.830
(0.612) (0.614) (0.656) (0.655)
Country-pair’s characteristics
Military alliance 1.140*** 0.826*** 0.935***
(0.369) (0.300) (0.331)
Political affinity 1.268*** 1.452*** 1.161***
(0.205) (0.214) (0.186)
Year trend -0.047***
(0.008)
Gravity controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No No No Yes No
Clusters 8765 8765 8765 8765 8765
Observations 66037 64531 64531 64531 64531
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country-pair level. The dependent variable,
Arms transfersijt, measures the volume of major weapons transfers from country i to country j at time
t. Net oil importijt measures the net oil import (import - export) of country i from country j at time t.
Gravity controls include Distance, Common colony, Common currency, Common ethnicity, Common language,
Common religion and RTAs. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table 2: Arms transfers and net oil import, PPML estimates with fixed effects
Arms transfersijt
(1) (2) (3)
Net oil importijt 1.112*** 1.615** 0.987***
(0.325) (0.627) (0.378)
Military alliance 0.911*** 0.808*** 0.812*
(0.298) (0.281) (0.484)
Political affinity 0.861*** 2.232*** 2.245***
(0.192) (0.581) (0.372)
Gravity controls Yes Yes Yes
Year trend Yes No No
Year fixed effects No No Yes
(i) and (j) fixed effects Yes No No
(it) and (jt) fixed effects No Yes No
(ij) fixed effects No No Yes
Clusters 8765 8919 1112
Observations 64531 63129 32573
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country-
pair level. The dependent variable, Arms transfersijt, measures the
volume of major weapons transfers from country i to country j at time
t. Net oil importijt measures the net oil import (import - export) of
country i from country j at time t. Gravity controls include Distance,
Common colony, Common currency, Common ethnicity, Common lan-
guage, Common religion and RTAs. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table 3: Arms transfers, net oil import and global oil dependence
Arms transfersijt
Oil richjt=1 if Oil richjt=1 if Oil reservesjt>=
New oil discoveriesjt>0 p75 p90 p95 p99
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Net oil importijt 1.602*** 1.574** 1.530** 1.458** 1.326**
(0.614) (0.632) (0.622) (0.616) (0.600)
Oil dependentit * Oil richjt 0.454** 0.232 0.269 0.542** 0.935***
(0.203) (0.248) (0.256) (0.262) (0.288)
Military alliance 0.808** 0.834*** 0.810** 0.794** 0.761**
(0.323) (0.312) (0.317) (0.309) (0.305)
Political affinity 2.232*** 2.240*** 2.217*** 2.214*** 2.147***
(0.320) (0.319) (0.318) (0.314) (0.308)
Gravity controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(it) and (jt) fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 8919 8919 8919 8919 8919
Observations 63129 63129 63129 63129 63129
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country-pair level. The dependent variable, Arms
transfersijt, measures the volume of major weapons transfers from country i to country j at time t. Net oil importijt
measures the net oil import (import - export) of country i from country j at time t. Oil dependentit is a dummy
variable that takes value equal to 1 if country i is a net oil importer in the global system at time t. Oil richjt is a
dummy variable that takes value equal to 1 if country j has a new oil discovery at time t, in column (1). In columns
(2)-(5), Oil richjt is redefined equal to 1 if country j’s total amount of oil reserves belongs to the 75th, 90th, 95th
and 99th percentile of the global oil reserves at time t, respectively. Gravity controls include Distance, Common
colony, Common currency, Common ethnicity, Common language, Common religion and RTAs. *p < 0.10, **p <
0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table 4: Robustness checks
Arms transfersijt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Avg. Net oil importij * ∆ ln oil pricet 1.080*** 1.200** 1.248** 1.060**
(0.488) (0.488) (0.491) (0.488)
Oil dependentit * Oil richjt 0.488**
(0.203)
Oil dependentit * Oil richjt (2nd def.) 0.449**
(0.227)
Oil dependentit * Oil richjt (3rd def.) 0.436*
(0.261)
Military alliance 0.625** 0.616** 0.643** 0.625**
(0.309) (0.308) (0.309) (0.308)
Political affinity 2.155*** 2.187*** 2.117*** 2.152***
(0.326) (0.327) (0.328) (0.326)
Gravity controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
(it) and (jt) fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 8919 8919 8919 8919
Observations 63129 63129 63129 63129
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country-pair level. The dependent
variable, Arms transfersijt, measures the volume of major weapons transfers from country i to
country j at time t. Avg. Net oil importij measures the average value of net oil import of country i
from country j over the whole sample period (1962-1999). ∆ ln oil pricet measures the ln-change in
international oil prices between t − 1 and t so as an increase in ∆ ln oil pricet implies a reduction
in international oil prices over time. Therefore, the interaction term Avg. Net oil importij * ∆ ln
oil pricet captures how variations in international oil prices affect the net oil import of country
i from country j over time (i.e. country i’s local oil dependence from country j at time t). In
column (2) the interaction Oil dependentit * Oil richjt is the one used in column (1) of Table 3. In
column (3) this interaction is between an indicator for countries with no oilfield discovery between
time t and t− 10 (as proxy for Oil Dependentit) and an indicator for countries with a giant oilfield
discovery (with size in top quartile) between time t and t − 3 (as proxy for Oil richij). In column
(4) the interaction is between an indicator for countries with a share of the global cumulative oil
discoveries below the median at time t (as proxy for Oil dependentit) and an indicator for countries
with a share of the global cumulative oil discoveries above the 99th percentile at time t (as proxy
for Oil richjt). Gravity controls include Distance, Common colony, Common currency, Com-
mon ethnicity, Common language, Common religion and RTAs. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table 5: Additional robustness checks
Arms transfersijt
Clustering Excluding Using gas
by exporter USA, RUS, SAU, IRN in lieu of oil
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Net oil importijt 1.615** 1.602** 3.084* 3.002*
(0.762) (0.748) (1.823) (1.787)
Oil dependentit * Oil richjt 0.454** 0.815***
(0.177) (0.208)
Net gas importijt 1.722 1.504
(1.247) (1.254)
Gas dependentit * Gas richjt 0.736***
(0.249)
Military alliance 0.812** 0.808*** 0.231 0.220 0.669** 0.734***
(0.277) (0.281) (0.336) (0.327) (0.326) (0.328)
Political affinity 2.245*** 2.232*** 1.463*** 1.381*** 2.164*** 2.238***
(0.597) (0.581) (0.413) (0.403) (0.329) (0.324)
Gravity controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(it) and (jt) fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 81 81 8907 8919 8919 8919
Observations 63129 63129 43879 63129 63129 63129
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the exporter level in columns (1)-(2) and at
country-pair level in columns (3)-(6). The dependent variable, Arms transfersijt, measures the volume of major
weapons transfers from country i to country j at time t. Net oil importijt measures the net oil import (import -
export) of country i from country j at time t. Oil dependentit is a dummy variable that takes value equal to 1 if
country i is a net oil importer in the global system at time t. Oil richjt is a dummy variable that takes value equal
to 1 if country j has a new oil discovery at time t. In columns (3)-(4) we exclude the major arms’ exporters (USA
and Russia) and the richest oil countries (Saudi Arabia and Iran). In columns (5)-(6), we re-estimate our main
specifications by using gas in lieu of oil. Gravity controls include Distance, Common colony, Common currency,
Common ethnicity, Common language, Common religion and RTAs. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table 6: Placebo regressions: using exports of machinery with comparable levels of sophistication to weapons as
outcome variable
Machinery exportsijt
Sector 71 Sector 72 Sector 73 Sector 74
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Net oil importijt -0.177 -0.181 -0.098 -0.113 -0.261 -0.286 0.149 0.147
(0.176) (0.174) (0.163) (0.161) (0.203) (0.202) (0.135) (0.136)
Oil dependentit * Oil richjt -0.053 -0.174 -0.185 -0.026
(0.108) (0.109) (0.121) (0.079)
All country-pair’s characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(it) and (jt) fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 8705 8705 8588 8588 7451 7451 8422 8422
Observations 65019 65019 65170 65170 59808 59808 65061 65061
Sector 75 Sector 76 Sector 77 Sector 78
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Net oil importijt -0.309 -0.334 0.198 0.160 -0.186 -0.194 -0.095 -0.094
(0.333) (0.323) (0.194) (0.186) (0.187) (0.185) (0.193) (0.192)
Oil dependentit * Oil richjt -0.217** -0.209 -0.091 0.019
(0.104) (0.151) (0.111) (0.131)
All country-pair’s characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(it) and (jt) fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 8278 8278 8695 8695 8678 8678 8540 8540
Observations 63573 63573 64973 64973 64877 64877 65114 65114
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country-pair level. The dependent variable, Machinery exportsijt,
measures the exports of Power-generating machinery and equipments (71), Machinery specialized for particular industries (72),
Metalworking machinery (73), General industrial machinery and equipment (74), Office and automatic data-processing machines
(75), Telecommunications and sound-recording apparatus (76), Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances (77), Road vehicles
(78) in columns (1)-(2), (3)-(4), (5)-(6), (7)-(8), (9)-(10), (11)-(12), (13)-(14), (15)-(16), respectively. Net oil importijt measures
the net oil import (import - export) of country i from country j at time t. Oil dependentit is a dummy variable that takes value
equal to 1 if country i is a global oil importer at time t. Oil richjt is a dummy variable that takes value equal to 1 if country j
has a new oil discovery at time t. Country-pair’s characteristics include Military alliance and Political affinity. Gravity controls
include Distance, Common colony, Common currency, Common ethnicity, Common language, Common religion and RTAs. *p <
0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table A.1: Variable definitions and sources
Variable Definition Source
Arms transfersijt Trend-indicator value (TIV) of major weapons
transfers from country i to country j at time t
in 10 million US$
Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI)
Arms Transfers Database
(http://www.sipri.org/
databases/armstransfers)
Net oil importijt Volume of net oil import (import - export) of
country i from country j at time t in 10 million
metric tons
Feenstra et al. (2005)
New oil discoveriesjt Volume of new oil discoveries in country j at
time t in thousand million barrels
Cotet and Tsui (2013)
Oil reservesjt Volume of oil reserves in country j at time t in
thousand million barrels
Cotet and Tsui (2013)
Oil dependentit Dummy for global oil importer countries Authors’ own
Oil richjt Dummy for countries with a new oil discovery
at time t
Authors’ own
GDP Real GDP in 10 million US$ Expanded Trade and GDP
Data - Gleditsch (2002) (http:
//privatewww.essex.ac.uk/
~ksg/exptradegdp.html)
Democracy Regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale
ranging from -10 to +10 (Polity2 indicator)
The Polity IV Project -
Marshall and Jaggers (2013)
(http://www.systemicpeace.
org)
NATO Dummy for countries belonging to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Authors’ own
Warsaw Pact Dummy for countries belonging to the Warsaw
Pact
Authors’ own
Military burden Military spending as a percentage of Real GDP The Correlates of War
(COW) Project (http:
//www.correlatesofwar.org/
Soldiers per capita Number of soldiers per capita (as a percentage
of Population)
COW
War Dummy for countries with a war Cotet and Tsui (2013)
Neighboring wars Number of neighboring countries with a war Authors’ own
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Table A.1: Variable definitions and sources – continued
Variable Definition Source
Arms embargo Dummy for countries with arms embargo from
either UN or EU
SIPRI Arms Embargoes
Database (http://www.sipri.
org/databases/embargoes)
Military alliance Dummy for pairs of countries with a formal
military alliance
COW
Political affinity Affinity of Nations score ranging from -1 (least
similar interests) to +1 (most similar interests)
United Nations General
Assembly Voting Data
- Voeten et al. (2013)
(https://dataverse.harvard.
edu/dataverse/harvard?q=
affinity)
Distance Capital-to-capital distance between countries
in a pair (in 10 million km)
CEPII distance database
(http://www.cepii.fr/
CEPII/fr/bdd_modele/
presentation.asp?id=6)
Common colony Dummy for pairs of countries with common
colonizer
CEPII distance database
Common currency Dummy for pairs of countries with common
currency
CEPII distance database
Common ethnicity Dummy for pairs of countries with the same
language spoken by at least 9% of the popula-
tion
CEPII distance database
Common language Dummy for pairs of countries sharing a com-
mon official or primary language
CEPII distance database
Common religion Percentage in which both countries share reli-
gions
CEPII distance database
RTAs Dummy for pairs of countries with regional
trade agreements in force
CEPII distance database
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Table A.2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
Arms transfersijt overall 8.14E-07 7.69E-06 0 0.000445 N = 66037
between 2.96E-06 0 0.0001211 n = 8919
within 5.29E-06 -0.0000983 0.0003806 T-bar = 7.40408
Net oil importijt overall 0.0028298 0.047657 -1.975061 1.776768 N = 66037
between 0.026982 -0.7229579 0.6972872 n = 8919
within 0.0294296 -1.249273 1.082311 T-bar = 7.40408
New oil discoveryjt overall 0.2607624 1.166614 0 26.06 N = 53104
between 0.7135286 0 26.06 n = 7141
within 1.023653 -9.389858 24.38469 T-bar = 7.43649
Oil reservesjt overall 14.42523 37.83175 0 269.2931 N = 53104
between 32.12553 0 268.0759 n = 7141
within 3.124776 -21.70162 38.02587 T-bar = 7.43649
Oil dependentit overall 0.6960038 0.4599845 0 1 N = 66037
between 0.4468527 0 1 n = 8919
within 0.2621927 -0.2706629 1.657542 T-bar = 7.40408
Oil richjt overall 0.616094 0.4863391 0 1 N = 66037
between 0.4665396 0 1 n = 8919
within 0.2348566 -0.356879 1.516094 T-bar = 7.40408
Country i’s characteristics
GDP overall 0.0660101 0.1399601 0.0003061 1.080727 N = 66037
between 0.0961951 0.0003061 1.055819 n = 8919
within 0.046305 -0.3761831 0.6000276 T-bar = 7.40408
Democracy overall 4.145049 7.633289 -10 10 N = 65971
between 7.563904 -10 10 n = 8894
within 2.994871 -12.2994 19.2627 T-bar = 7.41747
NATO overall 0.2881566 0.4529078 0 1 N = 66037
between 0.3628751 0 1 n = 8919
within 0.1047493 -0.6530198 1.249695 T-bar = 7.40408
Warsaw Pact overall 0.0468677 0.211357 0 1 N = 66037
between 0.1554131 0 1 n = 8919
within 0.1133512 -0.8975768 0.9357566 T-bar = 7.40408
Military burden overall 38.75193 47.23373 1.955919 439.1977 N = 65810
between 41.61042 2.387705 439.1977 n = 8886
within 26.69683 -164.8069 320.3836 T-bar = 7.40603
Soldiers per capita overall 0.0101501 0.0097293 0.0007721 0.0592347 N = 65878
between 0.0098963 0.0008129 0.0592347 n = 8913
within 0.0029402 -0.0095188 0.0306763 T-bar = 7.39123
Country j’s characteristics
GDP overall 0.0300009 0.0901078 0.0000366 1.080727 N = 66037
between 0.0782683 0.0000366 0.9897429 n = 8919
within 0.0246673 -0.4800269 0.4569758 T-bar = 7.40408
Democracy overall 0.9815015 7.783907 -10 10 N = 65627
between 7.166009 -10 10 n = 8893
within 3.327537 -16.206 15.11483 T-bar = 7.37962
NATO overall 0.1396944 0.3466723 0 1 N = 66037
between 0.290054 0 1 n = 8919
within 0.0592084 -0.7353056 1.048785 T-bar = 7.40408
Warsaw Pact overall 0.0087981 0.0933853 0 1 N = 66037
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Table A.2: Summary statistics – continued
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
between 0.0757552 0 1 n = 8919
within 0.0528084 -0.9245352 0.897687 T-bar = 7.40408
Military burden overall 30.12046 49.15098 0 1122.41 N = 65388
between 38.61121 0 1122.41 n = 8853
within 35.16985 -327.9368 1054.419 T-bar = 7.38597
Soldiers per capita overall 0.0081499 0.0084986 0 0.076889 N = 66005
between 0.0082349 0 0.076889 n = 8913
within 0.0029744 -0.0232502 0.0505131 T-bar = 7.40548
War overall 0.2285879 0.4199263 0 1 N = 66014
between 0.3630391 0 1 n = 8919
within 0.2478524 -0.7369294 1.201561 T-bar = 7.4015
Neighboring wars overall 0.7794115 1.034563 0 7 N = 66037
between 0.9453883 0 7 n = 8919
within 0.503142 -2.287255 3.946078 T-bar = 7.40408
Arms embargo overall 0.0334358 0.179773 0 1 N = 66037
between 0.1968729 0 1 n = 8919
within 0.1083636 -0.8832309 1.005658 T-bar = 7.40408
Country-pair’s characteristics
Military alliance overall 0.0893287 0.2852198 0 1 N = 66037
between 0.2241216 0 1 n = 8919
within 0.0750288 -0.8551157 1.050867 T-bar = 7.40408
Political affinity overall 0.6794393 0.3708258 -1 1 N = 66037
between 0.2877884 -0.8271789 1 n = 8919
within 0.1995143 -0.8619195 1.970751 T-bar = 7.40408
Distance overall 0.0007285 0.0004481 5.96E-06 0.0019951 N = 66037
between 0.0004415 5.96E-06 0.0019951 n = 8919
within 2.44E-19 0.0007285 0.0007285 T-bar = 7.40408
Common colony overall 0.029862 0.1702079 0 1 N = 66037
between 0.2274352 0 1 n = 8919
within 0 0.029862 0.029862 T-bar = 7.40408
Common currency overall 0.0027712 0.0525693 0 1 N = 66037
between 0.0505179 0 1 n = 8919
within 0.0354742 -0.7750066 0.9757441 T-bar = 7.40408
Common ethnicity overall 0.1429199 0.3499938 0 1 N = 66037
between 0.3405333 0 1 n = 8919
within 0 0.1429199 0.1429199 T-bar = 7.40408
Common language overall 0.1071066 0.3092511 0 1 N = 66037
between 0.3149798 0 1 n = 8919
within 0 0.1071066 0.1071066 T-bar = 7.40408
Common religion overall 0.1566662 0.2512904 0 0.992012 N = 66037
between 0.253095 0 0.992012 n = 8919
within 0 0.1566662 0.1566662 T-bar = 7.40408
RTAs overall 0.060133 0.2377348 0 1 N = 66037
between 0.1556189 0 1 n = 8919
within 0.1291106 -0.8963888 1.021671 T-bar = 7.40408
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Table A.3: Sensitivity analysis: using different definitions of Oil dependentit and Oil richjt
Arms tranfersijt
Oil richjt=1 if Oil dependentit=1 if
any giant any giant any giant no discov no discov no discov no discov
Baseline in [t− 4,t] in [t− 5,t] in [t− 6,t] in [t− 9,t] in [t− 8,t] in [t− 7,t] in [t− 6,t]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Avg. Net oil importij * ∆ ln oil pricet 1.248** 1.184** 1.178** 1.183** 1.242** 1.243** 1.262** 1.197**
(0.491) (0.485) (0.487) (0.487) (0.492) (0.494) (0.499) (0.485)
Oil dependentit * Oil richjt (2nd def.) 0.449** 0.496** 0.488** 0.433** 0.442** 0.447** 0.440** 0.398*
(0.227) (0.226) (0.229) (0.228) (0.227) (0.228) (0.234) (0.239)
All country-pair’s characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(it) and (jt) fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 8919 8919 8919 8919 8919 8919 8919 8919
Observations 63129 63129 63129 63129 63129 63129 63129 63129
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country-pair level. The dependent variable, Arms transfers, measures the volume of major weapons
transfers from country i to country j at time t. Avg. Net oil importij measures the average value of net oil import of country i from country j over the whole sample
period (1962-1999). ∆ ln oil pricet measures the ln-change in international oil prices between t− 1 and t so as an increase in ∆ ln oil pricet implies a reduction in
international oil prices over time. Therefore, the interaction term Avg. Net oil importij * ∆ ln oil pricet captures how variations in international oil prices affect the
net oil import of country i from country j over time (i.e. country i’s local oil dependence from country j at time t). Oil dependentit is a dummy variable that takes
value equal to 1 if country i has no oilfield discovery between time t− s and t. Oil richij is a dummy variable that takes value equal to 1 if country j has any giant
oilfield discovery (with size in top quartile) between time t− s and t. Country-pair’s characteristics include Military alliance and Political affinity. Gravity controls
include Distance, Common colony, Common currency, Common ethnicity, Common language, Common religion and RTAs. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table A.4: Heckman selection model: two-step estimates
Arms transfersijt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome Equation:
Net oil importijt 0.000028*** 0.000027*** 0.000029*** 0.000027***
(0.000003) (0.000003) (0.000003) (0.000003)
Oil dependentit * Oil richjt 0.000002 0.000002
(0.000002) (0.000001)
Military alliance -0.000002 -0.000000 -0.000000 0.000000
(0.000002) (0.000002) (0.000002) (0.000001)
Political affinity 0.000010*** 0.000010*** 0.000011*** 0.000011***
(0.000001) (0.000001) (0.000001) (0.000001)
Common religion -0.000009*** -0.000009***
(0.000001) (0.000001)
Common language 0.000003** 0.000004***
(0.000001) (0.000001)
Selection Equation:
Net oil importijt 0.378082*** 0.271010** 0.378082*** 0.271010**
(0.135296) (0.136011) (0.135296) (0.136011)
Oil dependentit * Oil richjt 0.154948*** 0.154948***
(0.036572) (0.036572)
Military alliance 0.479222*** 0.469871*** 0.479222*** 0.469871***
(0.029376) (0.029429) (0.029376) (0.029429)
Political affinity 0.146970*** 0.142814*** 0.146970*** 0.142814***
(0.027377) (0.027439) (0.027377) (0.027439)
Common religion -0.138524*** -0.122744*** -0.138524*** -0.122744***
(0.034405) (0.034617) (0.034405) (0.034617)
Common language 0.135111*** 0.151488*** 0.135111*** 0.151488***
(0.036345) (0.036505) (0.036345) (0.036505)
Inverse Mills’ ratio -0.000004 0.000003 -0.000000 0.000002
(0.000005) (0.000004) (0.000004) (0.000004)
Other gravity controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Excluded instrument Common religion Common language
Observations 64531 64531 64531 64531
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country-pair level. The dependent variable,
Arms transfersijt, measures the volume of major weapons transfers from country i to country j at time
t. Net oil importijt measures the net oil import (import - export) of country i from country j at time
t. Oil dependentit is a dummy variable that takes value equal to 1 if country i is net oil importer in the
global system at time t. Oil richjt is a dummy variable that takes value equal to 1 if country j has a new
oil discovery at time t. In the selection equation, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if Arms
transfersijt is positive, and zero otherwise. The excluded instrument (i.e. the variable excluded from
the outcome equation) is Common religion in columns (1)-(2) and Common language in columns (3)-(4),
respectively. The other gravity controls include Distance, Common colony, Common currency, Common
ethnicity and RTAs. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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